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Abstract: Th e main aim of this brief and purposely radical essay is to investigate 
further possibilities for empirical research in natural classifi cation of semiosis (signs 
as wholes). Before introducing emon – a missing term in the taxonomy of signs – we 
make a distinction between the natural and artifi cial, and between the taxonomic and 
meronomic classifi cations of signs. Natural classifi cations or typologies are empirically 
based, while artifi cial classifi cations do not require empirical test. Meronomy describes 
the relational or functional structure of the whole (for instance triadic, circular, etc. 
composition of sign), while taxonomy categorizes individuals (individual signs). We 
argue that a natural taxonomy of signs can be based on the existence of diff erent 
complexity of operations during semiosis, which implies diff erent mechanisms of 
learning. We add into the taxonomy a particular type of signs – emonic signs, which are 
at work in imitation and social learning, while being more complex than indexes and 
less complex than symbols. Icons are related to imprinting, indexes to conditioning, 
emons to imitating, and symbols to conventions or naming. We also argue that the 
semiotic typologies could undergo large changes aft er the discovery of the proper 
mechanisms or workings of semiosis. 
Keywords: icon; imitation; imprinting; mereology; natural classifi cation; sign develop-
ment; sign evolution; sign types; sign typology; social learning
Various signs exist. Signs exist – in the sense that they are unceasingly created; 
signs exist (only) in interpretation. Th eir classifi cation can be either artifi cial or 
natural. A classifi cation is natural if it is falsifi able, that is if there can be found 
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at least potentially empirical arguments about the real classes to disprove or to 
improve the classifi cation. Otherwise the classifi cation is artifi cial.1 
Th e classifi cations of signs2 used in contemporary general semiotics are very 
oft en those introduced by or stemming from the work of Charles Peirce.3 Can there 
be any observation that could disprove the Peircean ten-fold typology of signs? Or 
the 28- or 66-fold?4 No. Because these classifi cations are logically derived from 
the strictly triadic model, which by itself is logical and not empirical. Peircean 
typologies do not require an empirical research to be true. Th us, following the 
defi nition above, Peirce’s classifi cation of signs is artifi cial.5 
Indeed, we can, in a way, compare the Peircean combinatoric taxonomy of 
signs with an algebraic classifi cation of geometric fi gures. For instance, it makes 
sense to build the best algebraic classifi cation of polyhedrons; this classifi cation 
will certainly be usable for describing real forms. However, a study of real forms 
cannot help in improving the mathematical classifi cation. In relation to the real 
variability of the forms of cells, or drawings, or signs, such classifi cation is artifi cial. 
Th is is not a critique of Peirce. Peirce’s system is algebraic. It is based on his 
minimal model of sign, which is triadic, and the system derived from it is using the 
tacit assumption that a sign in all its complexifi cations and plurifi cations carries 
the basic minimal structure. As a result, in the Peircean system, the diversity of 
signs is a triversity. 
1 Th us we do not include logical mistakes into the class of empirical arguments.
2 In this article we use the terms ‘sign’ and ‘semiosis ’ as synonyms. Th is is based on the under-
standing that sign is – from one side – always a process, the sign process, sign pro cess being 
commonly called semiosis, and – from the other side, dually – sign is always a (simultaneous) 
whole. Th us representamen, object and interpretant are parts of sign.
3 On Peirce’s classifi cation of signs, see the recent volume Queiros, Stjernfelt 2019. 
4 About these Peircean classifi cations, see for instance Farias, Queiroz 2003. See also Peirce 
2015.
5 One should notice that this seems to contradict to what Peirce himself said: “All classifi ca-
tion, whether artifi cial or natural, is the arrangement of objects according to ideas. A natural 
classifi cation is the arrangement of them according to those ideas from which their existence 
results. No greater merit can a taxonomist have than that of having his eyes open to the ideas 
in nature; no more deplorable blindness can affl  ict him than that of not seeing that there are 
ideas in nature which determine the existence of objects. Th e defi nitions of Agassiz will, at 
least, do us the service of directing our attention to the supreme importance of bearing in mind 
the fi nal cause of objects in fi nding out their own natural classifi cations” (Peirce 1965: 103, CP 
1.231). From here we can clearly see that Peirce’s aim is natural classifi cation. However, we also 
see that, for him, the natural classes are limited to the systems organized by fi nal cause. Once 
we limit the existence of fi nal cause with living (or organic wholes), then it follows that Peirce’s 
concept of natural classifi cation is inapplicable for non-living objects. Our defi nition of natural 
classifi cation is not limited to the systems with fi nal cause (as for instance, natural classifi cation 
can be found also for chemical elements). Cf Liszka 2019.
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Th e problem of sign classifi cation is not so simple, though. Semiosis is the 
process in which meaning arises or emerges. Meaning, by its nature, is logical and 
not a physiological or psychological phenomenon. However, on the biosemiotic 
level, it is logic in an extended sense. Peirce is describing the very fundamentals of 
logic, and because it is logic, one cannot test it via physiological or psychological 
experiments. Th is is the anti-psychologism of Peirce (Stjernfelt 2013). Semiosis as 
the process in which meaning emerges is also a system of physiological processes, 
although which physiological processes was unclear for Peirce, and is not entirely 
clear even now. Still, since Jakob von Uexküll’s studies it has been clear that 
in order to make meaning, there should be a functional circle. Uexküll gave a 
certain physiological description to such functional circles. Functional circles 
were Uexküll’s model of semiosis (Krampen 1997). While describing semiosis 
as functional circles is necessary, they do not yet provide suffi  cient conditions 
for semiosis. Deacon (2011) has demonstrated the importance of constraints 
regenerating constraints which work reciprocally, to which we added the necessity 
of incompatible codes in simultaneity, or choice (Kull 2015; 2018). Still, suffi  cient 
conditions for semiosis have not yet been properly described.
Two questions follow: First, can we get any evidence as to whether the signs 
as they exist in real life are indeed triadic, and never, for instance, tetradic, or 
septadic, or maybe indefi nitely plural? Alternatively, perhaps signs are built so 
that their numerical characterization is irrelevant, or provide only an approximate 
model? 
Secondly, should the general structure of sign be related to the existing classes 
of signs? In parallel, we might ask whether in biological classifi cations, the 
structure of species are related to the genera and familia that exist and the number 
of species these include? – Th e answer would obviously be ‘no’. Why then should 
it be ‘yes’ in the classifi cation of signs?
To seek a natural, not artifi cial, classifi cation of signs, let us fi rst introduce 
the distinction between two diff erent types of classifi cations – meronomy and 
taxonomy of signs. Th is may help resolve some contradictions in the classifi cations 
found in the semiotic literature and may suggest a more systematic study of 
sign types. Following this distinction, we will describe a particular problem on 
sign typology found in semiotic literature, move to its solution, introduce the 
distinction between icon and emon, and fi nally address some earlier perspectives 
on the issue of semiotic typology. 
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Meronomy and taxonomy of signs
Taxonomy and meronomy are two complementary approaches to classifi cation 
or typology. Taxonomy joins individual objects into taxons (taxa) or classes, 
while meronomy divides a whole into merons or parts.6 For example, in biology, 
taxonomy deals with classifi cation of species into genera, familia, etc., or 
individual communities into community types, while meronomy deals with 
classifi cation (partitions) of an organism into organs, or an ecosystem into its 
functional components (see Table 1). By parallel, in semiotics taxonomy would 
describe the types of signs – or of texts, or narratives, or sentences, or organisms, 
while meronomy would describe the structure of signs – or of texts, narratives, 
sentences, organisms. 
Mereology can be defi ned as the study of meronomies. Typology is commonly 
understood as the study of taxonomies. Both are dealing with classifi cations. 
Table 1. A comparison between meronomy and taxonomy as the types of classifi cations.
General procedure Classifi cation
Types of classifi cation meronomy taxonomy
Objects of classifi cation parts of (e.g., sign or text 
or organism as) a whole
separate individuals (e.g., signs 
or texts or organisms) or their 
classes
Main method study of functional 
structure; describing the 
archetype of the whole
comparison and 
homologization of structures 
of individuals or classes
Name of the units meron taxon
Product of classifi cation 
(e.g., of semiosis)
structure (e.g., of 
semiosis)
types, classes (e.g., of 
semioses)
Both meronomy and taxonomy can be either artifi cial or natural. Partition of a 
sign can be described by a model in which the parts do not correspond to the 
empirically discovered parts of a sign – in this case the partition is artifi cial. Still, 
it is also conceivable that the described merons of sign correspond to real parts – 
then the meronomy is natural. Th e same is possible for taxonomies of signs – the 
6 About these concepts, see for instance Meyen 1977, 1978; Chebanov 2017. On the applica-
tions of this distinction, see, e.g., Pavlinov 2016. Th e term ‘meronomy’ has been used especially 
by Russian scholars; it is the classifi cation of parts of a whole as a result of mereological 
approach or partonomy (see, e.g., Calosi, Graziani 2014). A clear formulation of the opposition 
‘taxonomy/meronomy’ together with ‘taxon/meron’ was developed by Sergej Meyen (1977).
92 Kalevi Kull
taxa in a taxonomy correspond to real taxa in the natural taxonomy, while there is 
no such correspondence in case of an artifi cial taxonomy. 
Whether meronomy can produce a taxonomy?
Consider a functional partition of a simple whole into its natural parts. For 
instance, partitioning into three. Further, these parts, few in number, can also 
be partitioned using the same rule. Such two-level system is another whole, 
more complex, while still produced by the same partitioning principle. With this 
method, we can get the description of a large number of wholes, which are all 
products of the same partitioning principle. Th is is close to how Peirce produced 
the classes of signs. All taxonomic diversity of signs, according to his classifi cation, 
imply triadic meronomic partitioning such that new forms are extension of 
Peirce’s logical triadic archetype – from the archetype of the whole and its limited 
possibilities of construction.
As repeatedly stressed by Frederik Stjernfelt, Peirce’s classifi cation of signs is 
fundamentally a product of meronomic procedure (e.g., Stjernfelt 2000). It deals 
with the functional structure of sign (as semiosis) and its components. Its triadic 
principle is derived from the assumed logical structure of semiosis itself which 
cannot be dismissed in any of its parts. Since the division into merons is relational, 
the resulting Peircean classes of signs are necessarily interdependent. New sign 
types are generated in Peircean semiotics by partitioning or combining the small 
number of existing types. 
Th erefore, the possibility of a natural taxonomy of signs is not a trivial ques-
tion – an artifi cial taxonomy may correspond to the natural taxonomy, and it may 
not. However, a natural taxonomy of signs is feasible if what is taken as the object 
of classifi cation is not an artifi cial logical model of semiosis but features of sign 
relations that can be independently identifi ed. Th is assumes that there can exist 
certain independent variability in subprocesses of semiosis as a whole. 
How can we get to natural taxonomy of signs that can be tested? First, we 
should assume that there could emerge features of signs that are not logically 
deriveable from the basic model of sign. Second, we should assume the possibility 
of self-categorization or speciation of signs. Th us we should not assume that the 
whole taxonomy can be derived from the fundamental model or archetype of 
sign (although this does not exclude the possibility that the derivation from a 
good enough fundamental model may work). In this case, the testable natural 
classifi cation will be possible.
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It is important to pay attention to the fact that at least for some aspects of 
semiosis, in certain limited groups of signs, rather good natural taxonomies 
already exist – for instance, in case of linguistic features of the elements of 
human languages, gestures, some groups of artefacts. However, and somewhat 
paradoxically, a general typology of signs has not yet achieved natural classifi cation. 
As mentioned above, Peircean classifi cation has not yet proven to be a natural 
classifi cation and may not be until tools to demonstrate its correspondence to a 
testable classifi cation are found. 
In particular, we observe that the icon-index-symbol taxonomy has been 
used both as a logical product of meronomy and as a natural taxonomy. Peirce’s 
typology is mainly mereological. Frederik Stjernfelt in his writings about Peirce 
interprets his typology as truly mereological. For Stjernfelt, the perception-action 
cycle is a natural proposition, with an argument-structure (even in a bacterium, 
indeed, “a very primitive” one); sign types are rather aspects of semiosis (Stjernfelt 
2012). In contrast, Th omas Sebeok’s six-fold typology of signs is rather naturally 
taxonomical (or at least semi-taxonomical).7 Also Terrence Deacon’s typology in 
his Symbolic Species (Deacon 1997), however based on Peirce, is an attempt at 
a natural semiotic taxonomy. Deacon temporalizes sign types: these appear in 
ontogeny one emergent from another with a symbolic threshold zone separating 
human language from animal and vegetative sign systems.
Let us now explore classes of signs in pursuit of a natural taxonomy, not by 
updating Peircean classifi cation which is the product of a particular meronomic 
model. Our approach below deals exclusively with a natural taxonomy of signs, 
which therefore should not be drawn from a fundamental sign model. Even 
accepting the Peircean triadic model of sign (triadicity belonging to meronomy), 
sign taxonomy can be achieved on an empirical basis without restrictions about 
the number of taxa. 
The icon–index–icon–symbol paradox
In the semiotic literature we fi nd variable and incompatible usage of the names of 
sign types. For some researchers, all signs are called symbols because they are at 
least to a certain extent arbitrary. For others, two main sign types exist – pictorial 
(as if continuous) signs are called icons, and textual (as if discrete) signs are called 
symbols. For still others, all signs have indexical aspects because they all refer to 
something. 
7 Th is distinction has been characterized by Umberto Eco as the diff erence between Peirce-
ologists and Peirceans; Eco identifi ed himself with the latter (Eco 2014: 510).
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Nevertheless, icon, index, and symbol are very widely used both in semiotics 
and beyond as the three major sign types. Th at just three, and namely these three, 
became accepted as principal sign types has obviously happened due to Peirce’s 
indirect infl uence. In parallel, oppositional (or diff erential, the binary) defi nition 
of meaning as supported by the Saussurean tradition works in the background and 
oft en modifi es the usage of concepts. A contemporary semiotician is infl uenced 
by both. Here, let us focus on Peircean triads. 
In the literature on semiotics, there are two traditions for dealing with basic 
three sign types. One that corresponds to Peirce, uses the sequence icon–index–
symbol. Th e other (e.g. Roland Barthes’s), uses the sequence index–icon–symbol. 
It seems that there is no single source for taking index as fi rst. Barthes, when 
using the index–icon–symbol row (Barthes 1968: 37) refers to De l’acte a la pensée 
(1942) by Henri Wallon, who might be one responsible for introducing this 
“reversed” sequence. Yet it is likely that several authors have used the index–icon–
symbol row just independently, up to recent times (e.g., Sadowski 2009).
Th us, index is sometimes understood as preceding icon, and sometimes as 
following icon. Th at is what I call here the icon–index–icon–symbol paradox.
A solution to the paradox: There are more sign types
Th ere are two obvious solutions to this paradox. Th e fi rst, that either icon–index–
symbol or index–icon–symbol is wrong. Th e second, that there exist two rather 
diff erent types of signs that have both been described as icon; that means, icon1–
index–icon2–symbol.
I shall argue for the second solution. Th is means that both sequences of the 
triad have their reasonable uses. Simply, in case of index–icon–symbol, icon1 has 
not been noticed, while in case of icon–index–symbol, icon2 has been ignored. 
Accordingly, both had their restrictions.
It is understandable that for those researchers who focus on human sign 
systems and particularly on language, the primary icon (icon1) may be ignored. 
Such researchers would use the index–icon–symbol system, since the conditional 
learning resulting in conditioned refl exes and representing indexical relations is 
already so simple and elementary that there seems no reason to delve further. For 
example, imitation is an obvious candidate for iconicity. Since imitation is a more 
advanced capacity than conditional learning, it should stay aft er the indexicality 
(as icon2) in the temporalized sequence of sign types. 
For instance, when Juri Lotman used the iconic-symbolic opposition, he did 
not speak about icons in the sense of Peirce or Eco. Lotman’s icons are rather of 
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the second type (icon2).8 Th e fi rst type of icons (icon1) is rather close to what Eco 
referred to as ‘hypoicon’ (Eco 1999: 339).
Th us, the term ‘icon’ is used in two diff erent taxonomic senses – as simpler 
than index, and as more complex than index.9 Indeed, resemblance is of two very 
diff erent types. Simplifying, the fi rst is based on indistinguishability, the second 
on similarity. Th e origin of these types of resemblance are either in the mechanism 
of recognition, or of imitation.
Despite the same names – icon, index, symbol – that Peirce is using in a diff erent 
sense (i.e. not about signs as wholes, but as the relations between representamen 
and object, thus rather as merons), there is already a common tradition of using 
these names also as names for separate sign taxa. Th e additional distinctions 
introduced next may resolve some controversies. 
Emon – a missing term in the taxonomy of signs
We add here the fourth type (taxon) – emonic signs, a sign type between index and 
symbol, the icon2 – the existence or lack of which in organisms’ communication 
might be the reason for many behavioural diff erences. We make distinction 
between icons and emons and propose the sequence icon–index–emon–symbol. 
Doing so may resolve the ambiguous usage of the sequence index–icon–symbol 
instead of the original icon–index–symbol in some semiotic theories.
Th e word ‘emon’ as proposed here for the name of the sign type can be seen 
as a derivation from Greek ‘ημων’ (‘ἡμῶν’), meaning ‘company’. Occasionally, the 
term ‘emon’ has been used by Paul Nemirovsky to denote an element of emotional 
or aesthetic information (Nemirovsky 1999; Nemirovsky, Davenport 2002). 
Emon may thus be related to emotions, empathy, imitation. Note that imitative 
learning assumes the capacity for analogization, and accordingly, the processes of 
amplifi cation, which can possibly be identifi ed with emotions. Perhaps the mecha-
nisms of imitation employs mirror neurons (see Wiedermann 2003; Panksepp 2011).10
Most invertebrates cannot use emons due to the lack of the relevant mechanism 
of learning. Emons are acquired via imitation or social learning, and exist in 
8  It should be added that index did not belong to Juri Lotman’s typology of signs, except on 
some specialized occasions (e.g., Lotman 1990: 26–27, 103, 111). (I thank Silvi Salupere for this 
note .)
9  Th ere exists an extensive semiotic literature and decades-long debate on the defi nition of 
iconicity (see for instance Eco 1999: 337ff ).
10  Cf. also a distinction between imitation and emulation in Bandura 2009[1971]; some other 
aspects of emonic kind of resemblance, see Williams, Colling 2018.
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animals with emotions. Emonic semiosis would be present in vertebrates (birds 
and mammals), not invertebrates (insects). Th e transition from non-imitating to 
imitating animals would be the emonic threshold zone. 
Types of signs as related to the types of learning
Semiosis as interpretation diff ers from deterministic (or even algorithmic) pro-
cesses by the potential for innovation. Th is cleavage between the deterministic 
and innovative systems is pointing to the semiotic systems as learning systems. 
Learning itself is not the same as semiosis. Learning happens if interpretation 
(semiosis) leaves a trace (a scaff old) that infl uences further interpretations. 
Learning fi xes the link established in interpretation.11 If the form of the link 
requires diff erent mechanisms of learning as dependent on the complexity of the 
link established, then certain correspondence between the types of semiosis (sign) 
and the mechanisms of learning should be the case.
Th e relationship between semiosis and learning can be described by the fol-
lowing steps or stages of this process:
(a)  incompatibility: what can induce a functional change is an incongruence of 
existing sign relations, a semiotic confl ict or untranslatability;
(b)  innovation: if several options (possibilities) are available simultaneously, then 
a choice-like switch may take place; this solves the incompatibility (cf semiosis 
as problem-solving) by using one option and removing the rest; it establishes a 
connection (link), commonly with the help of existing scaff olding;
(c)  habituation: this is how the new connection may become stabilized, and 
some times, partially inherited.
Learning means that a relatively stable mediator will be built that carries the link 
(bond) established in interpretation. In other words, learning is memory-building. 
Diff erent complexity of the process demonstrates the possible relationship with 
diff erent mechanisms of learning:
(i)  iconic: if a link (the mediator) becomes reproduced, then this mediator, 
when linking, presents an operation of recognition; this would correspond to 
imprinting as a form of learning;
(ii)  indexical: if the connection is linking two separate recognition events, then 
it will produce preferably the bonds (relations) between those things that are 
co-present or correlated – thus the link presents the operation of association; 
this would correspond to conditioning as a form of learning;
11  On some additional aspects of semiotic learning see Kull 2018.
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(iii) emonic: if it is possible to link to a link, then it tends to produce a linkage 
that models (imitates) the whole pattern of a regular situation, producing a 
representation; this would correspond to imitating as a form of learning;
(iv) symbolic: if it is possible to interlink representations, then it implies the 
possibility to compose any patterns (thus providing full open-endedness); 
also, since at that level, the patterns produced can be isolated (detached, 
independent) from the regularities; this would correspond to conventioning 
or naming as a form of learning;
Such typology describes the diff erent levels of morphological forms as constructed 
(designed) by diff erent types of semiosis as logical operations:
(i)  vegetative level: recognition, iconic – swarms, territories, lines, trees, bodies;
(ii)  animal level: conditioning, indexical – centres, circles, spaces, homes;
(iii)  emotional level: imitation, emonic – family groups, social customs;
(iv)  cultural level: replacement, symbolical – times, narratives, calculations, 
recombinations.
While this typology is stemming from the Peircean approach, its stress on natural 
taxonomy more than on mereology may require a wholly diff erent terminology, in 
order to avoid unnecessary polysemy. Moreover, there could be more taxa in this 
taxonomy than four. For instance, we could additionally distinguish between two 
types of recognition (in an analogy with the diff erence between iconic qualisign 
and iconic sinsign in Peirce), resulting in the following taxonomy of signs:
(ia) percon, based on elementary recognition;
(ib) nexon, based on categorization (collective recognition by the neural tissue);
(ii) junction, based on association;
(iii) emon, based on imitation (mimicking);
(iv) nomon, based on composition (arranging, combination).
Discussion: Some comments on earlier works on emons
Th e idea about the existence of emon-like signs has appeared in the works of 
several semioticians. Below we point out some of these. 
(1) Artifi ce
Th e importance to add a fourth type of sign was also noticed by Roman Jakobson. 
He wrote:
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Th e “artifi ce” is to be added to the triad of semiotic modes established by Peirce. 
Th is triad is based on two binary oppositions: contiguous/similar and factual/
imputed. Th e contiguity of the two components of the sign is factual in the index 
but imputed in the symbol. Now, the factual similarity which typifi es icon fi nds 
its logically foreseeable correlative in the imputed similarity which specifi es the 
artifi ce, and it is precisely for this reason that the latter fi ts into the whole which 
is now forever a four-part entity of semiotic modes. (Jakobson 1985[1975]: 215; 
Jakobson 1980: 22; our emphasis in the fi nal clause, K. K.)
W. C. Watt (1981: 430) has commented:
Jakobson provides the occasional shaft  of light into Peirce’s murky domain, as 
when [Jakobson 1980: 11] he observes that a signans may refer to its signatum 
by means of contiguity, similarity, and/or convention: that is, respectively by an 
index, an icon, and/or a symbol [notice the order! – K. K.]. He later [Jakobson 
1980: 22] analyses these binarily (contiguous/similar and factual/imputed) 
and fi lls the missing cell in the resulting 2x2 matrix by adding the “artifi ce”, or 
metaphor, which resembles the icon in asserting a similarity between signans and 
signatum but diff ers in that in the artifi ce the similarity is imputed rather than 
factual as in the icon. Th is new semiotic tetrachotomy should sharpen discussion 
among those so inclined.
Here Jakobson (1985[1975]: 214–215) uses the term ‘artifi ce’ in reference to 
Gerard Manly Hopkins, who wrote:
Th e artifi cial part of poetry, perhaps we shall be right to say all artifi ce, reduces 
itself to the principle of parallelism. Th e structure of poetry is that of continuous 
parallelism [...]. But parallelism is of two kinds necessarily – where the opposition 
is clearly marked, and where it is transitional rather or chromatic. [...] To the 
marked or abrupt kind of parallelism belong metaphor, simile, parable, and so on, 
where the eff ect is sought in likeness of things, and antithesis, contrast, and so on, 
where it is sought in unlikeness. To the chromatic parallelism belong gradation, 
intensity, climax, tone, expression (as the word is used in music) [...]. (Hopkins 
1959[1865]: 84–85; our emphasis, K. K.)
When speaking about artifi ce, Hopkins as well as Jakobson assign this only to arts. 
Largely coinciding to our observations about emon, the features of this type of 
sign are clearly such that its manifestation is certainly not limited to arts. 
It should also be noted that Jakobson uses a pair of binary oppositions in 
his defi nition – despite a reference to Peirce. Binary structures, of course, were 
not at all what Peirce himself would use. Yet, binary oppositions are more of a 
meronomic than of a taxonomic kind. Th erefore, for emon being a taxonomic 
unit, it would be misleading just to identify it with artifi ce. 
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(2) Synesthon
William C. Watt (1987; 1999) introduced the sign type that he calls ‘synesthon’, 
while calling this switch from the Peircean triadic classifi cation to a tetrachotomy 
a ‘neo-Peircean approach’. He placed synesthons (that evoke similar feelings) 
between index and symbol (Watt 1987: 339). Later, however, Watt (2011: 369) 
hypothesizes that “there are really only two fundamental kinds of signs, the 
synesthon [...] and symbol”.
(3) Meme
Emon as the sign based on imitation may seem to have some similarity with 
Richard Dawkins’ concept of meme. However, there are several fundamental 
reasons why these two are deeply diff erent. Th e most important diff erence between 
them concerns the basic logical incongruence — meme is defi ned as based on 
replication (copying), while emon is defi ned as based on interpretation process.12 
From this many consequences follow. Th e replication process leads to the 
incorporation of meme (as an analogue of gene) into the neo-Darwinian model. 
Th e interpretation process as the one on which imitation is based, makes emon 
a concept of non-neo-Darwinian theory. Another aspect is that many writings in 
memetics mix up the symbolic and presymbolic level of signs, even if they mean 
that memes are signs (which they oft en do). And last but not least, by the end 
of the internet journal of memetics itself, it became clear to some proponents of 
memetics themselves that meme is not a good term. Later, the term has been used 
to denote only the forms of epidemic distribution (Marino 2015). 
(4) Returning to Peirce: the rhematic iconic legisign
Peirce’s ten-fold taxonomy of signs includes three kinds of iconic signs. Th ese 
are iconic qualisign, iconic sinsign, and iconic legisign (all three being rhemes). 
Th e fi rst two (iconic qualisign and iconic sinsign) are simpler than indexical 
signs, while the iconic legisign is, in a certain sense, situated between index and 
symbol if mapped on the three-fold taxonomy of signs. Th e ten classes in Peircean 
taxonomy cannot be naturally ordered into a linear sequence, therefore such 
mapping is not unambiguous. Also, as said above, it is not entirely clear whether 
we could take Peircean classifi cation as natural. However, the features of iconic 
legisign fi t well what we have described here as emon. 
12 Even if meme has been defi ned as produced by imitation, the innovative aspect of inter-
pretation that is characteristic of imitation has not been taken into account. 
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Conclusion
One of the big problems that inhibits the development of semiotics is the absence 
of agreement on the basic terminology of sign taxonomy. Semioticians seldom 
agree on identifi cation of sign types. Semiotic textbooks are oft en incompatible in 
their sign typologies. However, a basic sign typology is indispensable to semiotics.
Th e Peircean typologization of signs into ten classes – despite the clear defi nitions 
of these taxa – has been applied rather seldom in practical semiotic studies. More 
oft en a much simpler classifi cation is used. Th e aim of our essay was to build a 
mediating “scaff old” for moving from a simple three-fold typology of signs into 
a more detailed but still obvious natural taxonomy. We did it by describing the 
type of signs we called emons. Together with this, linking the sign types to the 
types of learning mechanisms, we tried to demonstrate a way to develop a natural 
taxonomy of signs that would open further possibilites for empirical semiotic 
research and the post-Peircean taxonomies.
We did not include the defi nition of sign (semiosis) itself in this work. If the 
model of sign will be substantially modifi ed (for instance, see some hints towards 
this in Brandt 2016 and Kull 2018), then the implications can aff ect the analysis 
above. Indeed, we expect that both meronomy and taxonomy of signs will be 
fundamentally changed, when we shall truly understand the conditions in which 
sign emerges. However, we hope that the distinctions described above will open 
up a space for further studies in the fi eld of typology of semiosis.
Finally – can we really break the three, the triadic model of semiosis? Will this 
mean the non-acceptance of Peircean semiotics? No. Th is will just be a next step – 
post-Peircean (bio)semiotics13.14 
13 Th e idea about post-Peircean biosemiotics has been expressed recently by Alin Olteanu 
(2019) and Claudio J. Rodrí guez.
14 Acknowledgements. A part of this paper was presented at a semiotic congress in Nanjing 
(Kull 2014). I thank Frederik Stjernfelt and Göran Sonesson for helpful discussions and Jeremy 
Sherman for improving the text. Th is work was supported by the Estonian Research Council 
grant PRG314.
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Шаги к естественной мерономии и таксономии семиозиса: эмон 
между индексом и символом?
Цель этой краткой и намеренно радикальной статьи состоит в том, чтобы взглянуть на 
некоторые возможности для эмпирического исследования естественной классификации 
семиозиса (знака как целого). Прежде чем вводить эмон – отсутствующий термин в 
таксономии знаков – мы проводим различие между естественными и искусственными, 
а также между таксономической и мерономической классификациями знаков. Есте-
ствен ные классификации или типологии основаны на эмпирических данных, в то 
время как искусственные классификации не требуют тестирования. Мерономия опи-
сы вает реляционную или функциональную структуру целого (например, триад ный, 
пентадный и т. д. состав знака), в то время как таксономия классифицирует инди-
видов (отдельные знаки). Утверждаем, что естественная таксономия знаков может 
основываться на существовании различной сложности операций семиозиса, что, в свою 
очередь, подразумевает разные механизмы обучения. Мы добавляем новый тип знаков 
к используемой таксономии – эмонические знаки, которые являются основой для 
подражания и социального обучения, будучи более сложными, чем индексы, и менее 
сложными, чем символы. Иконы связаны с импринтингом, индексы с упражнением, 
эмоны с имитацией и подражанием, а символы с соглашением и именованием. Однако 
следует также иметь в виду, что семиотические типологии могут претерпеть большие 
изменения после открытия надлежащих механизмов работы семиозиса.
Mõned sammud semioosi loomuliku meronoomia ja 
taksonoomia poole: eemon indeksi ja sümboli vahel?
Käesoleva lühikese ja teadlikult radikaalse kirjutise eesmärk on vaadelda mõningaid võimalusi 
semioosi (ehk märgi kui terviku) loomuliku klassifi katsiooni empiiriliseks uurimiseks. Selleks 
määratleme esmalt erinevused loomuliku ja kunstliku ning meronoomilise ja taksonoomilise 
klassifi katsiooni vahel. Loomulikud klassifi katsioonid põhinevad empiirikal, kunstlikud klassi-
fi  katsioonid aga testimist ei eelda. Meronoomia kirjeldab terviku funktsionaalset struktuuri, 
taksonoomia aga kategoriseerib indiviidide hulka. Väidame, et märkide loomulik taksonoomia 
saab tugineda semioosi operatsioonide erinevale keerukusele, millega omakorda seostuvad 
erinevad õppimismehhanismid. Lisame kasutatavale taksonoomiale uue märgitüübi – eemoni 
ehk emoonilise märgi, mis on aluseks imiteerimisele ja sotsiaalsele õppimisele. Eemon on 
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keerukam kui indeks, kuid lihtsam kui sümbol. Ikoonid seostuvad vermimisega, indeksid 
harjutamisega, eemonid jäljendamisega ning sümbolid kokkuleppimise ja nimetamisega. 
Tuleb aga ühtlasi silmas pidada, et semioosi tõeliste mehhanismide avastamisel saavad olema 
olulised tagajärjed ka märkide tüpoloogiale. 
